



Director of
Central
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
Contents

/ West Germany: *Opposition to INF Timetable* 1



25X1


// Pakistan-US: *Demarche on F-16 Equipment* 8



25X1



Top Secret



8 November 1982

25X1

25X1

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25X1

① WEST GERMANY: Objections to INF Timetable

West German officials want to delay visible deployment of INF equipment in the basing countries until next September.

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Defense Ministry officials told members of a US briefing team on Wednesday that introducing cruise missile equipment in the UK next June and converting US Pershing I to Pershing II launchers in West Germany between June and September might provide a new focus for anti-INF demonstrators. The West German public has not been told of the deployment timetable, and West German arms control commissioner Ruth said his government had assumed that deployment would not begin before September.

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The officials in Bonn also emphasized the need to subordinate technical and military considerations to political sensitivities, and they would prefer some readjustment of the deployment timetable in both the UK and West Germany. In addition, they insisted again that the number of Pershing II missiles, launchers, and warheads intended for deployment in West Germany total no more than 108. They said this position is held at "the highest level" of the government.

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Comment: The West Germans acknowledge the need to begin INF support preparations well in advance if the new missiles are to be operational by December 1983. They fear, however, that the visible movement of INF equipment six months in advance of this date will make it difficult to convince the public that Washington is negotiating seriously in Geneva.

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The delay does not indicate a change in West Germany's firm commitment to NATO's dual-track decision on INF. It suggests, however, that the West Germans are ready for a slippage in the program to prevent an unraveling of domestic political support for it.

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
8 November 1982

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Next 8 Page(s) In Document Denied

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25X1



11

PAKISTAN-US: Demarche on F-16 Equipment

Pakistan has threatened not to accept any of the 40 F-16s ordered last year--including the six scheduled for delivery next month--unless the US approves the advanced ALR-69 radar warning receiver for the aircraft. Islamabad says failure by the US to provide the system--especially after Pakistan has signed an agreement to protect US weapon technologies--would undermine the credibility of Islamabad's defenses and reinforce Pakistani doubts about US reliability.

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Comment: Islamabad is unlikely to reject the F-16s, but it is pressing for resolution of the issue before President Zia's visit to the US next month. In the near term, Pakistan probably will honor its pledge to safeguard new US weapon systems to protect the arms supply relationship. Islamabad has provided Beijing with Western arms in the past, however, and continues to have close military relations with the Chinese. It is likely that China will at some point gain access to the new US systems provided to Pakistan, especially if major strains develop in Islamabad's relations with Washington.

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Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied

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